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The Determinants of Companies’ Levels of Integration: 




This article extends current knowledge in the field of integrated thinking and reporting (ITR) by 
providing new empirical evidence on the nature and determinants of companies’ levels of integration 
(i.e. ITR levels). Based on legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory, we empirically investigate 
companies’ levels of integration and examine the drivers of different ITR levels. Our results suggest 
that companies’ levels of ITR, namely Holistic, Integrated, Conservative, and Minimalist, are related 
to company characteristics and tend to remain consistent over time exhibiting routine and imitation. 
Companies with greater size, leverage, bigger board size and meetings, as well as companies 
operating in sensitive industries and with higher environmental performance are more likely to exhibit 
a Holistic or Integrated level of integration, while Minimalist and Conservative levels are driven by 
the same variables in opposite direction. Furthermore, at country level, economic growth, market 
performance, citizens freedom and lower environmental performance significantly contribute to 
higher integration. These results could drive companies’ choices alongside policymakers’ initiatives, 
by identifying which levers should be pulled to achieve the desired level of integration, and suggest 
the need for a tailored approach rather than a one size fits all within the debate on the future 
developments of ITR. 
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Corporate reporting represents the essential tool through which companies communicate with their 
stakeholders as part of their accountability and stewardship obligations (Fedération des Experts 
Comptables Européens, 2015; PwC, 2015). Recent trends in the broader business environment – 
including globalisation, financial crisis, and changes in regulation – have increased stakeholders’ 
expectations on corporate reporting and communication. Indeed, stakeholders are calling for 
enhanced reporting of corporate responsibility and other information that would impact business 
performance (Miller & Skinner, 2015; PwC, 2013, 2015). In response to these growing needs, the 
ways organizations report their annual performances are currently being questioned, debated, and 
redesigned throughout the world, and the use of voluntary information is increasing to ensure 
transparency, accountability, and access to useful information (Busco, Granà, & Quattrone, 2017; 
Dumay, Bernardi, Guthrie, & Demartini, 2016).  
In this context, Integrated Reporting (IR) is promoted as a solution to the concerns of financial 
reporting and has been portrayed by an emerging body of literature as in transition to make the leap 
from a promising concept to a powerful practice (Adams & Simnett, 2011; Busco, Frigo, Quattrone, 
& Riccaboni, 2013; Eccles & Krzus, 2010). Whether presented as a rational choice to face existing 
challenges (Adams, 2015; Churet & Eccles, 2014; Knauer & Serafeim, 2014; Serafeim, 2015), as a 
ceremonial response to the increasing pressures of markets and society (Higgins, Stubbs, & Love, 
2014; van Bommel, 2014), or a temporary fad and fashion (Brown & Dillard, 2014; Flower, 2015; 
Milne & Gray, 2013), IR has rapidly gained considerable prominence as one of the main management 
and accounting innovations of the recent decade (Dumay et al., 2016; De Villiers, Rinaldi, & 
Unerman, 2014; De Villiers, Venter, & Hsiao, 2017a). IR is the visible part to external stakeholders 
of what is happening inside a business, i.e. integrated thinking (IT) and integrated decision-making 
(IIRC, 2013). To successfully incorporate IR in an organization, it needs to permeate all layers 
through IT, that is the active consideration by an organization of the relationships between its various 
operating and functional units and the capitals that the organization uses or affects (IIRC, 2013). 
A growing number of studies investigate integrated thinking and reporting (ITR) practices. 
Early studies have focused on theoretical analyses (e.g., Adams, 2015; Eccles & Krzus, 2010; Flower, 
2015; Haller & Van Staden, 2014) and case studies (e.g., Adams, Potter, Singh, & York, 2016; Eccles 
& Serafeim, 2014). Part of literature shows the adoption of IR to be associated with enhancing 
corporate reputation, attracting institutional investors, engaging stakeholders, and improving resource 
allocation (Burke & Clark, 2016; Churet & Eccles, 2014; Serafeim, 2015), while other literature 
questions the notion of IR as a superior reporting mechanism (Maniora, 2015). Few recent empirical 
studies analyse IR determinants and find growth opportunities, company size, gender diversity, 
profitability, industry concentration (Frías-Aceituno, Rodríguez-Ariza, & García-Sánchez, 2013, 
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2014), and country-level factors (Vaz, Fernandez-Feijoo, & Ruiz, 2016) to explain the decision to 
present an integrated report. Recent studies published in the special issues of Accounting, Auditing 
and Accountability Journal in 2018 and Meditari Accountancy Research in 2017 provide micro-level 
analysis of IR and IT practices. However, more empirical evidence on ITR is crucial to inspire 
regulatory initiatives towards possible future mandatory IR requirements (Dumay et al., 2016). What 
seems to be missing, to the best of our knowledge, are empirical studies on the level of integration of 
financial and non-financial aspects in a firm’s day to day decision making processes, how it evolves 
over time and its determinants. Indeed, companies can adopt different levels of integration, as 
management’s commitment towards integration can happen at different levels. Recognising the 
existence of different levels of integration, analysing their distinctive features and determinants have 
the potential to inspire IR development towards either ad hoc initiatives or a one size fits all approach. 
Aiming to address this gap, this paper relies on a sample of 583 European listed companies over 
the period 2002-2015 to achieve a threefold purpose. First, we identify companies’ levels of 
integration and observe their evolution over time to address the first research question: i) What are 
companies’ levels of integration? We define the level of integration (or ITR level) focusing on a 
measure of management’s commitment and effectiveness towards integrating financial and extra-
financial aspects, retrieved from Thomson Reuters Asset4 database, thus differentiating from 
previous literature that investigates IR based on whether or not companies issue an integrated report 
(Frías-Aceituno et al., 2013, 2014; Vaz et al., 2016). Second, we investigate whether and how the 
different integration levels are related to companies’ idiosyncratic characteristics to answer our 
second research question: ii) Are integration levels related to companies’ characteristics? We 
identify four different integration levels (or ITR levels, i.e. Holistic, Integrated, Conservative, and 
Minimalist) by grouping companies based on the distribution of their integration levels over time (see 
Section 4.1). Finally, we investigate the determinants of the different integration levels building on 
legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory; we empirically test whether a company’s level of 
integration is the result of a legitimation process, especially for bigger and more profitable companies 
(i.e. De Villiers & van Staden, 2006; O’Donovan, 2002), as well as whether it represents a way to 
account towards stakeholders, specifically through corporate governance (i.e. Freeman, 2010; Frías-
Aceituno et al., 2013). For this purpose, we implement panel data models to address our third research 
question: iii) What drives companies’ levels of integration? 
The main results show that companies’ different levels of integration (i.e. ITR levels) are related 
to their idiosyncratic characteristics and tend to be consistent over time exhibiting routine and 
imitation. Each level expresses a company’s commitment towards the integration of financial and 
non-financial aspects, that is higher for Holistic companies, followed by Integrated, Conservative, 
and finally lowest for Minimalist companies. The analysis of companies’ levels of integration, 
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together with their characteristics (i.e. performance, size, risk, governance, and sector) lead to the 
presentation of four comprehensive groups and allow observing the evolution over time. Furthermore, 
the analysis of the determinants of ITR levels documents that the level of integration is not a random 
choice as it depends on companies’ characteristics. Companies with greater size, leverage, bigger 
board size and meetings, as well as companies operating in sensitive industries and with higher 
environmental performance are more likely to exhibit higher levels of integration (Holistic or 
Integrated). Similarly, firms operating in countries with higher level of economic growth, market 
performance, citizens freedom, and lower environmental performance are more likely to be Holistic 
or Integrated. Lower level of integration (Minimalist or Conservative) is driven by the same key 
variables but in the opposite direction. These findings show clear differences in the level of 
integration based on companies’ size; large firms are in a better position to do integrated thinking and 
reporting as they have the required resources and they can make all the efforts to bring integration 
within the organization; on the other side, small firms simply don’t do it because they seem not to 
have the necessary resources, capacity, maybe incentives, to be more integrated. These results 
recommend the need for a tailored approach, rather than a one size fits all, towards possible adoption 
of ITR that takes into consideration company specific characteristics. These outcomes are confirmed 
across a variety of robustness checks. 
This research complements the existing literature on corporate reporting by providing new 
empirical evidence on ITR level and its determinants, thereby answering the call for further empirical 
evidence in this field (Adams, 2015; De Villiers et al., 2017a; Dumay et al., 2016; Serafeim, 2015). 
We contribute to previous literature on corporate reporting (among others, Cheng, Ioannou, & 
Serafeim, 2014; Luo, Wang, Raithel, & Zheng, 2015; Qiu, Shaukat, & Tharyan, 2016) by identifying 
distinctive ITR levels and their evolution over time. We complement previous studies on the 
determinants of IR (Frías-Aceituno et al., 2013, 2014; García-Sánchez, Rodríguez-Ariza, & Frías-
Aceituno, 2013; Jensen & Berg, 2012; Vaz et al., 2016) by using an alternative measure and a 
comprehensive dataset, and we expand the analysis of ITR determinants across distinctive ITR levels. 
Furthermore, by providing an in depth empirical analysis on ITR levels and the role of companies’ 
characteristics in affecting these levels, this study contributes to the debate on the future developments 
of IR by offering insights to companies and policymakers about which levers should be pulled to 
achieve the desired level of integration, and highlighting the need for a tailored approach. From a 
practical perspective, the findings from this study suggest companies are not all the same in their 
integration journey, indeed they can be substantially different, and these differences need to be 
carefully considered across different perspectives. An improved understanding of the predispositions 
towards integration is of interest to managers, because they would be interested in identifying which 
internal levers can be pulled to enhance integration as well as how the external environment affect 
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this; to regulators, because they may want to consider implementing regulations that should be 
differentiated based on companies’ characteristics and the environment in which they operate; to 
policymakers, i.e. IIRC, because our findings may support initiatives related to the creation of special 
interest groups studying IR and IT best practices based on companies size, performance, and sector; 
to capital market participants, because these findings can inform their investment decision making. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature, discusses 
the theoretical framework, and develops the hypotheses to test. Section 3 describes sample, variables, 






2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Integrated Thinking and Reporting: Current Knowledge and Research Gap  
The International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) defines IR as a process founded on IT that 
results in a periodic integrated report, which is “a concise communication about how an 
organization’s strategy, governance, performance and prospects, in the context of its external 
environment, lead to the creation of value over the short, medium and long term” (IIRC, 2013, p. 7). 
Through IR, top management communicates, mainly to investors, how sustainability issues and 
initiatives are expected to contribute to the business growth in the short, medium, and long-term 
(Churet & Eccles, 2014; IIRC, 2013). As described by IIRC (2013), IT is the active consideration of 
the relationship between a company’s operating units and the capitals; IT leads to integrated decision-
making and actions towards value creation over the short, medium, and long term. Overall, the 
number of companies implementing IR and providing specific examples in their annual reports is 
small but increasing; its structure is evolving from a sustainability reporting focus to a purely business 
and investor focus (Milne & Gray, 2013) and its implementation requires a change in accounting and 
management processes within the organization (Adams, 2015). So far, apart from companies listed 
in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (King IV, 2016), IR represents a voluntary disclosure in other 
countries where companies can consider adopting a principle-based framework as proposed by IIRC 
(2013). 
Academic literature shows a growing interest in the field although an extensive review 
conducted by Dumay et al. (2016) documents little research examining ITR practices. Majority of 
studies focus on theoretical analyses (e.g., Adams, 2015; Eccles & Krzus, 2010; Flower, 2015; Haller 
& Van Staden, 2014) and case studies (e.g., Adams et al., 2016; Eccles & Serafeim, 2014). While an 
extensive literature investigates the determinants of corporate social and environmental reporting, 
few recent empirical studies examine the factors that may influence managers’ actions towards IR 
(e.g., Frías-Aceituno et al., 2013, 2014; García-Sánchez et al., 2013; Jensen & Berg, 2012; Vaz et al., 
2016). A stream of literature documents several benefits arising from companies’ commitment 
towards IR: IR has a positive association with quality of management (Churet & Eccles, 2014); IR 
advances corporate reputation resulting in a better ability to attract institutional investors (Serafeim, 
2015; Steyn, 2014); IR improves external engagement with stakeholders by reducing information 
asymmetry, and leads to better resource allocation, cost reduction, and better alignment between 
internal and external reporting (Burke & Clark, 2016). Similarly, Brown and Dillard (2014) highlight 
the role of IR as a new way to explain how a company creates value over time, and Bernardi and 
Stark (2016) show the effectiveness of IR on analyst forecast accuracy in South Africa. Adams et al. 
(2016) document that companies committed to the IIRC pilot programme present more clear 
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disclosure on the purpose and outcomes of social investment and its link to long-term progress, risk, 
and strategy. Maniora (2015) instead contradicts the general notion of IR as a superior reporting 
mechanism as the benefits of IR are driven by several factors and depend on the sample group 
observed. Along the same lines, Reimsbach, Hahn, and Gürtürk (2017) find that integrating 
sustainability and financial information increases access but does not improve acquisition of 
sustainability information. Recent research also attempts to develop an initial framework for the 
assurance of an integrated report (Maroun, 2017). 
The special issue of Meditari Accountancy Research (2017) contributes to explain IR processes 
and practices. De Villiers, Hsiao, and Maroun (2017b) present a conceptual model of the overall IR 
process that can be used as an organising framework to understand about various influences, identify 
factors to control for in a study, and find previously unexplored research questions. Their model is 
based on IR literature and includes IR determinants and consequences, acknowledges IIRC’s 
processes and influences, and shows report users and preparers. Although the model shows the main 
cause and effect relationships (i.e. organizational factors can affect the adoption of IR), the authors 
acknowledge the possibility of reverse causality, as well as concepts within each group can influence 
each other. While McNally, Cerbone, and Maroun (2017) explore challenges and highlight practical 
issues of producing an integrated report, Dumay, Bernardi, Guthrie and La Torre (2017) focus on 
barriers and issues in the IIRC framework that has hindered a wider adoption and implementation of 
IR. Drawing on an interpretation of materiality as a social construction, Lai, Melloni, and 
Stacchezzini (2017) explore the meaning that practitioners attach to the IR principle by focusing on 
who participates in determining IR materiality. Du Toit (2017) investigates the readability of 
integrated reports to determine whether they are accessible to their readership and if they add value 
to stakeholders. Del Baldo (2017) discusses the usability of the IIRC framework for small and 
medium-sized enterprise (SME) and the need to adapt the IR principles to SME needs and features. 
Dumay and Dai (2017) explore integrated thinking as a cultural control and present the case study of 
a small Australian bank. Guthrie, Manes-Rossi, and Orelli (2017) analyse changes in internal 
structures and processes following the introduction of the IR framework, finding that the adoption of 
the framework has led to IT, however the change is more incremental than revolutionary. The special 
issue also includes case studies across different countries, i.e. South Africa (Du Toit, 2017; McNally 
et al., 2017), Australia (Dumay & Dai, 2017), Columbia (Macias & Farfan-Lievano, 2017) and Italy 
(Silvestri, Veltri, Venturelli, & Petruzzelli, 2017). 
Based on the analysis of 65 published IR research studies over the period 2012-2017 and using 
the idea journey theoretical framework, Rinaldi, Unerman, and De Villiers (2018) conceptualize and 
analyse the development of IR as an “idea journey” to highlight challenges, success, strengths and 
weaknesses that IR experiences across the whole of its journey. The idea journey comprises a 
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sequence of five main phases (i.e. idea generation, idea elaboration, idea championing, idea 
production, and idea impact) and previous studies are classified over these five main phases. This 
research documents a considerable growth in volume and scope of research studies, although it 
emerges that IR research has not yet covered the entire IR journey; indeed, there is relatively little IR 
research at the final journey phase of idea impact. Some of these gaps have been filled by recent 
papers, published in the special issue of Accounting Auditing and Accountability Journal (2018), that 
provide micro-level analysis of IR practices at the idea impact phase of the IR journey. McNally & 
Maroun (2018) show that the decision to prepare an integrated report in an African eco-tourism 
company has led to different forms of resistance to the introduction of IR and IT which can limit its 
change potential; nonetheless, accounting for financial and non-financial information through IR has 
a transformative potential which may lead to broader management control and a more integrated 
conception of value. IR is envisioned as a “rational myth” in a multinational European company, that 
challenged the vision of IR suggested by IIRC and implemented its own version of an integrated 
company (Gibassier, Rodrigue, & Arjaliès, 2018). Lai, Melloni, and Stacchezzini (2018) find that, 
for an insurance company, IR stimulates deep reasoning processes and facilitates dialogue between 
preparers and users; IR provided an opportunity to face challenges inherent to the insurance sector; 
although IR is able to produce socializing effects for a range of stakeholders, investors and financial 
stakeholders represent the primary addressees of IR. The analysis conducted by Vesty, Ren, and Ji 
(2018) document how the position of an individual senior manager can indicate to other in the 
organization whether to support the implementation of the IR idea. Al-Htaybat and von Alberti-
Alhtaybat (2018) describe the mechanisms that led a global service company to be an integrated 
thinker and document that IT comes first, is managed from the top, and IR represents its natural 
extension in the case of a global service company. 
Although ITR research is emerging in the financial reporting literature, to the best of our 
knowledge there is no empirical evidence on companies’ levels of integration. Indeed, in the context 
of voluntary disclosure, companies can choose different degrees of integration of financial and non-
financial aspects in their decision-making processes, thus resulting into different levels of integration 
in thinking and reporting (i.e. ITR level). Observing companies’ voluntary behaviour towards ITR 
and identifying the determinants would be crucial to drive companies’ choices alongside policy 
initiatives within the corporate reporting debate. Specifically, if companies’ level of integration is 
related to their idiosyncratic characteristics, it would suggest the need for tailoring corporate 






2.2 Theoretical Background 
Socio-political theories, including legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory, have been extensively 
used by previous literature to investigate corporate reporting practices, and in particular sustainability 
reporting (Comyns, 2016; Prado-Lorenzo & García-Sánchez, 2010; Qiu et al., 2016; Reverte, 2009). 
Legitimacy theory considers the relationship between the organization and society (Comyns, 
2016) and is based on the idea that, in order to continue to operate successfully, corporations must 
act within the bounds of what society identifies as socially acceptable behaviour (O’Donovan, 2002). 
To remain legitimate, companies may conform or attempt to alter social perceptions and expectations; 
if any change is agreed, this must be accompanied by disclosures, so that the intended audience is 
informed about what the company is doing as part of the legitimation process (Dowling & Pfeffer, 
1975; O’Donovan, 2002). Legitimacy theory assumes the existence of a social contract between the 
business and the individual members of the society, based on which every company has a moral 
obligation to act in a socially responsible manner (Guthrie & Parker, 1989; O’Donovan, 2002). 
Consequently, corporate disclosures are made as reactions to environmental factors, are driven by 
public pressure, and aim to achieve social legitimacy, particularly for companies having a significant 
environmental and social impact (Campbell, 2000; Cho & Patten, 2007; Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 
1995; Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Patten, 1991, 2002; Walden & Schwartz, 
1997). Indeed, companies may use disclosures, or increase the extent of their disclosure, when they 
feel their legitimacy is threatened, i.e. following negative events or external pressure (Branco, 
Eugénio, & Ribeiro, 2008; Comyns, 2016). Legitimacy theory is useful in explaining the role of 
company size and profitability in affecting the level of integration; we want to empirically test 
whether a company’s level of integration is the result of a legitimation process, especially for bigger 
and more profitable companies (i.e. De Villiers & van Staden, 2006; O’Donovan, 2002). Indeed, 
bigger and more profitable companies are in the spotlight of public opinion, receive public pressure, 
have more resources, and, therefore, are expected to be more inclined to have higher integration levels 
and to show their integration to remain legitimate. 
While legitimacy theory focuses on the relationship between the organization and society, 
stakeholder theory refers to the relationship between the organization and its stakeholders (Comyns, 
2016). Freeman (1984, p.46) defines a stakeholder as “any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of the firm’s objectives”. According to stakeholder theory, a major 
objective of the firm is to balance the conflicting demands of various stakeholders (Ansoff, 1965; 
Donaldson & Preston, 1995) as well as a major role of corporate management is to assess the 
importance of meeting stakeholder demands to achieve firms’ strategic objectives (Freeman, 2010). 
As such, stakeholder theory has been used in previous studies to explain social responsibility 
disclosure (Depoers, Jeanjean, & Jérôme, 2016; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 2010; Frías-
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Aceituno et al., 2013; Roberts, 1992; Ullmann, 1985). Companies use environmental and social 
reporting to account for their activity towards stakeholders, i.e. shareholders, creditors, legislative 
bodies, customers, suppliers, and special interest groups (Freeman, 2010; Frías-Aceituno et al., 2013; 
Roberts, 1992). Similarly, stakeholder theory is useful in explaining the link between governance 
characteristics and the level of integration; for example, the board of directors, as main decision-
making body in an organization, is responsible for safeguarding the interests of the different 
stakeholders also by integrating relevant financial and non-financial information in the decision 
process as well as through the dissemination of information (Ferreira, 2010; Frías-Aceituno et al., 
2013). We want to empirically test whether a company’s level of integration represents a way to 
account towards stakeholders, specifically through corporate governance (i.e. Freeman, 2010; Frías-
Aceituno et al., 2013). 
 
 
2.3 Hypotheses Development 
 
2.3.1 Company size 
Previous literature finds size and industry classifications as main drivers of social disclosure (i.e., 
Cormier, Magnan, & Van Velthoven, 2005; Cowen, Ferreri, & Parker, 1987; Frías-Aceituno et al., 
2013; Patten, 1991; Qiu et al., 2016). Larger companies tend to receive more attention from the 
general public and higher pressure to exhibit social responsibility (i.e. Cowen et al., 1987; Qiu et al., 
2016), whereas smaller sized companies might not have the same level of public pressure and might 
tend to provide information through more informal channels (Cowen et al., 1987). Moreover, 
companies whose activities have the potential to affect the environment, i.e. those operating in 
consumer-oriented industries, can be expected to exhibit greater concern and enhanced social 
responsibility disclosure (Cowen et al., 1987). Legitimacy theory can help explain the relationship 
between firm size and the level of integration; indeed, corporations voluntarily disclose social and 
environmental information to send messages to “society” (Deegan, Rankin, & Voght, 2000; 
O’Donovan & Gibson, 2000), and their legitimation techniques/tactics would differ depending on 
whether the organization is trying to gain, or extend, or maintain legitimacy or to repair (or defend) 
its lost or threatened legitimacy (O’Donovan, 2002). Bigger corporations are more in the spotlight of 
public opinion, receive public pressure and, therefore, will do whatever they regard as necessary in 
order to preserve their image of a legitimate business (De Villiers & van Staden, 2006). In the context 
of IR, Frías-Aceituno et al. (2014) find size, profitability, and industry concentration have a positive 
impact on producing an integrated report, rather than a financial report or a sustainability report. 
Similarly, García-Sánchez et al. (2013) find that larger and more profitable companies carry out 
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wider-ranging disclosure practices, as well as firms in the capital goods and utilities sectors are more 
likely to publish an integrated report. Large companies are more visible to the public, more 
newsworthy and more likely to be subject to public resentment, consumer hostility and attention of 
regulatory bodies (Henderson, Peirson, Herbohn, & Howieson, 2015; Reverte, 2009); consequently, 
they are expected to engage more in voluntary disclosures as legitimating behaviour (Dowling & 
Pfeffer, 1975; Reverte, 2009). In line with these arguments and based on legitimacy theory, we expect 
that bigger companies are in the spotlight of public opinion and therefore are more inclined to operate 
and communicate in an integrated manner. 
H1. Company size has a positive and significant impact on the level of integration. 
 
2.3.2 Profitability 
In the context of legitimacy theory, Neu, Warsame, and Pedwell (1998) assume the relationship 
between financial and environmental information can be either confirmatory or disconfirmatory, i.e. 
positive or negative. When the organization is profitable, environmental disclosure would reassure 
stakeholders that profit has not been made at the expense of the environment; whereas when the 
company is not profitable, environmental disclosure may instead convince stakeholders that the 
current environmental investments will lead to long-term profitability (Neu et al., 1998). A positive 
relationship between profitability and social disclosure can be explained by management’s 
knowledge: if the management has the ability to make a company profitable, along the same lines it 
would be able to understand the importance of disclosing social and environmental information 
(Belkaoui & Karpik, 1989). Moreover, profitable companies also have more resources available to 
support voluntary disclosures while companies with constrained resources may need to be selective 
in allocating resources on activities that impact their performance (Reverte, 2009). These arguments 
seem to suggest that higher profitability would lead to higher levels of integration. However, 
empirical evidence shows contrasting results (Cho & Patten, 2007; Frías-Aceituno et al., 2014; 
García-Sánchez et al., 2013; Patten, 2002). Moreover, literature shows that corporations can decrease 
specific disclosures when they perceive them to be potentially more damaging than helpful to 
maintain legitimacy, thus adding the dimension of reduced disclosure as a legitimising strategy (De 
Villiers & van Staden, 2006). Any change needs to be accompanied by disclosures (O’Donovan, 
2002) and corporations may reduce environmental disclosures at some point or change the type 
(general/specific) of disclosure as and when they perceive shifts in legitimacy threats (De Villiers & 
van Staden, 2006). Based on the existing debate, and drawing from legitimacy theory, we expect the 
existence of a significant relationship between profitability and the level of integration, but no 
assumption is made on the direction of the relationship. 




According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the relationship between internal governance mechanisms 
and corporate disclosure practices may be complementary or substitutive. On the one hand, the 
complementary relationship assumes that effective corporate governance mechanisms will strengthen 
company’s internal control; in an intense monitoring environment, the management is less likely to 
withhold information thus resulting in more information disclosed to reduce opportunistic behaviours 
and information asymmetry (Leftwich, Watts, & Zimmerman, 1981). On the other hand, the 
relationship may be substitutive as the strength of corporate governance, and therefore the security 
and reliability of internal control mechanisms, would lead to reduced disclosure; in such situation, 
one corporate governance mechanism may substitute the other (Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Cormier 
& Magnan, 2014; Samaha, Khlif, & Hussainey, 2015). However, each corporate mechanism is not a 
panacea (Frías-Aceituno et al., 2013) and therefore it is desirable a complementary view with 
overlapping checks and balances. In this research we assume a complementary relationship and test 
the impact of corporate governance characteristics, i.e. board size, activity, and independence, on the 
level of integration. We follow stakeholder theory and the idea that companies need to be able to 
balance demands of various stakeholders, besides shareholders and creditors (Ansoff, 1965); there is 
a wide range of stakeholders who are interested in companies’ attitudes towards sustainability, non-
financial information and integration in day to day decision making processes (Frías-Aceituno et al., 
2013). In light of stakeholder theory, we believe that corporate governance mechanisms, such as 
board size, activity, and independence, play an important role in defining good practices to enhance 
corporate disclosure, stakeholder engagement, as well as achieve holistic transparency and 
integration. 
Previous studies find contradicting results for the relationship between board size and firm 
voluntary disclosure. On the one hand, large board size increases the pool of expertise and available 
resources (Hidalgo, García-Meca, & Martínez, 2011), allow diverse experiences and opinions 
potentially increasing board’s supervisory capacity, thus implying more voluntary disclosure 
(Gandía, 2008); greater board size and diversity is found to have a positive influence on the 
integration of corporate information (Frías-Aceituno et al., 2013). On the other hand, Herman (1981) 
argues that large boards are more likely to be ineffective as it is difficult to schedule meetings and 
reach consensus (Lipton & Lorsh, 1992) reducing the board’s monitoring ability and contributing to 
less voluntary information; on this line, Prado-Lorenzo and García-Sánchez (2010) document a 
negative relationship between board size and information disclosure on greenhouse gases, thus 
suggesting that board of directors are more focused on creating economic value, rather than dealing 
with social responsibility and stakeholders’ expectations. Other studies (i.e. Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; 
Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005) find no significant relationship between size 
14 
 
and voluntary disclosure. In the context of our research, we believe that the integration of financial 
and non-financial aspects in day to day decision-making requires the involvement of directors with 
sufficient experience and diversity, which is more common to have in larger boards. We expect that 
higher number of directors would lead to better monitoring and, consequently, this would have a 
positive effect on the breadth and integration of corporate reporting and decision-making process 
(Frías-Aceituno et al., 2013; García-Sánchez, Rodríguez Domínguez, & Gallego Álvarez, 2011).  
H3.  Board size has a positive and significant impact on the level of integration. 
 
Previous studies have used board meeting frequency to proxy for strategic control (Vafeas, 
1999), board workload (Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2008) or board vigilance in the presence of activist 
shareholders (Cohn & Rajan, 2013). Board meetings are considered fundamental for directors to 
obtain information, participate in decision making, avoid personal liability, and perform their 
monitoring and advisory roles (Adams & Ferreira, 2012). A stream of literature documents that more 
active boards result in better supervision and control, as well as have interest in providing higher 
disclosure to inform stakeholders about their efforts (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). Moreover, when boards 
have a considerable number of meetings, they are able to execute their supervisory functions more 
effectively, thus resulting in reduced information asymmetry (Frías-Aceituno et al., 2013; 
Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Whalen, 2007). Following from the stakeholder theory and in line with 
previous literature, we believe that a higher number of board meetings would have a positive impact 
on the level of voluntary disclosures and increase the level of integration of corporate reporting and 
decision-making process. 
H4. Board meetings have a positive and significant impact on the level of integration. 
 
The independence of the board of directors usually refers to the presence of non-executive 
directors and represents an essential corporate governance mechanism to control the actions of 
managers and protect stakeholders’ interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Frías-Aceituno et al., 2013). 
Non-executive directors are expected to apply greater objectivity and independence in their company 
management (Prado-Lorenzo & García-Sánchez, 2010) and are most interested in ensuring regulation 
compliance and responsible behaviour (Zahra & Stanton, 1988). This results in increased quality and 
quantity of information as well as the ability to be more receptive to new information demands (García 
Sánchez et al., 2011). Independent board members are expected to defend the dissemination of 
information as a way to ensure accountability (Prado-Lorenzo & García-Sánchez, 2010) and, 
consequently, boards with higher percentage of independent directors are expected to have higher 
voluntary disclosures and commitment towards integration. 





The sample for this study is drawn from the STOXX Europe 600 Index representing large, mid, and 
small capitalization companies across 18 European countries1 for the period 2002-2015. Based on the 
availability of relevant data for this study, the final sample includes 583 companies for the period of 
analysis, that make up 6,318 firm-year observations. Table 1 presents the distribution of the sample 
across country in Panel A and across single-digit Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) in Panel 
B2. 
[Table 1 near here] 
 
3.2 Variables 
Table 2 describes the variables used in the analysis. Firm specific variables are sourced and built from 
Datastream and Thomson Reuters while macroeconomic variables are collected from Bloomberg, 
World Bank, and other sources3. The main variable of interest, ITR_SCORE, is collected from 
Thomson Reuters Asset4 database and measures “a company's management commitment and 
effectiveness towards the creation of an overarching vision and strategy integrating financial and 
extra-financial aspects”4, thus reflecting a firm’ ability to “convincingly show and communicate” the 
integration of both financial and non-financial dimensions in its day-to-day decision-making 
processes. Thomson Reuters Asset4 assigns this overall score based on data points collated on an 
annual frequency for each company. The individual company score is estimated by equally weighting 
and z-scoring all underlying data points and comparing them against all companies in the Asset4 
universe using a proprietary system. In describing the score, Asset4 refers to drivers and outcomes 
(De Villiers et al., 2017a). The components of the score (see Appendix) capture whether integration 
is incorporated into managers’ day to day decision making, i.e integrated thinking, as well as the 
ability to communicate, i.e. reporting outcomes. Thus, we consider ITR_SCORE as a relative measure 
of the level of integration, in both thinking and reporting (ITR level), for a firm in a year and is 
                                                          
1 The STOXX Europe 600 Index, derived from the STOXX Europe Total Market Index (TMI), is a subset of the STOXX 
Global 1800 Index, and has a fixed number of 600 components. At the time of data collection (August 2016), STOXX 
Europe 600 Index included companies across 18 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Since 19th September 2016, Greece was removed from this Index, following its 
re-classification as emerging and developing market. 
2 The sample includes both financial and non-financial companies. In the context of ITR, financial companies do not 
follow different set of frameworks (i.e. International Integrated Reporting Framework by IIRC, 2013); therefore, financial 
companies are not excluded from the sample. In support of this, the ITR_SCORE variable used in the analysis, as measured 
by Datastream, applies the same criteria for all companies across different sectors. However, robustness checks are 
provided to test the existence of specific ITR strategies for firms operating in non-financial sectors (Section 4.4).  
3 Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy; Reporters Without Borders. 
4 As described in Thomson Reuters Asset4 database. 
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expressed as a percentage between 0 (minimum level) and 100 (maximum level). Based on the 
distribution of ITR_SCORE each year over 2002-2015, we categorise firms as adopting four levels of 
ITR (i.e. Holistic, Integrated, Conservative, and Minimalist)5. While relatively widespread in the 
corporate reporting literature (i.e., Cheng et al., 2014; Luo et al., 2015; Qiu et al., 2016), Thomson 
Reuters Asset4 scores have also been used in recent studies in the field of IT and IR (i.e. Maniora, 
2015; Serafeim, 2015; Venter, Stiglingh, & Smit, 2016). See Table 2 for a description of the variables 
and the appendix for further details on ITR_SCORE. 
[Table 2 near here] 
 
3.3 Empirical Models 
The empirical analysis aims to investigate the drivers of different levels of integration. Using 
univariate analysis on a range of firm fundamentals, we identify four ITR groups and explore their 
switching behaviour over time. This initial analysis is crucial to investigate whether each ITR group 
is significantly different from the others as well as whether and how a company’s level of integration 
changes over time. 
Panel data regressions are then used to test the research hypotheses6. First, we estimate a panel 
data random effect regression model (Eq.1) to investigate the impact of company characteristics on 
the level of integration.  
𝐼𝑇𝑅_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 +
+𝛽5𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽ℎ𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿ℎ ℎ,𝑡 + 𝜀      (1)                                                                                          
The dependent variable in Eq. (1) is the integrated thinking and reporting score (ITR_SCORE). 
It is a function of firm size (SIZE - H1), profitability (ROE - H2), and governance variables 
(BOARD_SIZE - H3, BOARD_MEET - H4, BOARD_INDEPEND – H5); i (i = 1, 2, …, 583) identifies 
the sample companies and t represents the period (t = 2002, 2003, …, 2015). We also control for other 
firm characteristics, including LEVERAGE, STRATEGIC_SHARE, CEO_SHARE, ENV_PERF, 
IND_SENS (following De Villiers et al., 2017a; De Villiers & Marques, 2016; De Villiers, Naiker, 
Van Staden, 2011; Frías-Aceituno et al., 2013, 2014; García-Sanchez et al., 2013; Qiu et al., 2016)7. 
Moreover, we use country level variables to control for country’s economy (GDP), stock market 
(MARKET_INDEX), environmental impact (EPI_INDEX), investor protection (INV_PROT), World 
Bank measures (VOICE_ACC_WB, REG_QUAL_WB, GOV_EFF_WB) and media freedom 
                                                          
5 The empirical analysis for the identification of the different ITR levels is detailed in Section 4. 
6 We test for random effect model using the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test. The null hypothesis (H0: The 
variance across entities is zero) is rejected in favour of the panel effect for the sample. The statistics are not reported here 
and available on request.  




(FREEDOM) following previous literature (i.e. De Villiers et al., 2017a; De Villiers & Marques, 
2016; Jensen & Berg, 2012; Simnett, Vanstraelen, Chua, 2009; Vaz et al., 2016). See Table 2 for 
variables description. To validate the results, the dependent variable from Eq.(1) is replaced by a 
categorical variable representing the four ITR levels, and an ordered logistic panel data regression 
model is implemented to further investigate the role of company characteristics in affecting the 
different ITR levels. 
Furthermore, in order to capture more complicated relationship, we discretize the ITR_SCORE 
into ITR categories and logistic panel data random effect regressions are used to estimate the factors 
affecting the probability of belonging to a specific ITR group with respect to the others, as follows: 
𝑃𝑟(𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝑓(𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 +
+𝛽5𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1𝑗  + ∑ 𝛽ℎ𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿ℎ,𝑡ℎ )    (2) 
𝑃𝑟(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝑓(𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 +
+𝛽5𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1𝑗  + ∑ 𝛽ℎ𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿ℎ,𝑡ℎ )    (3) 
𝑃𝑟(𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝑓(𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 +
+𝛽5𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1𝑗  + ∑ 𝛽ℎ𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿ℎ,𝑡ℎ )    (4) 
𝑃𝑟(𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝑓(𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 +
+𝛽5𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1𝑗  + ∑ 𝛽ℎ𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿ℎ,𝑡ℎ )    (5) 
In Equation (2), the dependent variable HOLISTIC is a dummy variable assuming value 1 for 
the companies included in the Holistic group, and 0 otherwise. Likewise, in Equation (3), (4), and (5) 
the dependent variable is replaced by INTEGRATED, CONSERVATIVE, and MINIMALIST dummy 
variables respectively. All the other variables in the regression models are the same presented under 






4.1 Companies’ levels of integration 
This section examines the level of integration over the period 2002-2015 by: i) grouping companies 
based on their ITR_SCORE to categorize firms into four distinctive groups; and ii) using univariate 
analysis to assess firm characteristics across the ITR groups. From Table 3, across the sample period 
analysed, ITR_SCORE ranges from 8.42 (minimum) to 98.64 (maximum), with an average score of 
69.56 and median value of 85.32. Higher median in comparison to the mean indicates a negatively 
skewed distribution, with more firm-year observations in the higher quartile distorting the mean. Both 
mean and median ITR_SCORE values stabilize from 2009-2010 onwards. Overall, a gradual increase 
in firm-year observations and median value show a positive trend over time highlighting an increasing 
attention towards integrating financial and non-financial information8. 
[Table 3 near here] 
Based on the distribution of ITR_SCORE for each year over 2002-2015, we categorize firms 
into four ITR groups: i) Holistic, when a company’s ITR_SCORE in a year is higher than the third 
quartile value (>75p) for that year; ii) Integrated, when a company’s ITR_SCORE in a year is lower 
than the third quartile value (<75p) and higher than the median value (>50p) for that year; iii) 
Conservative, when a company’s ITR_SCORE in a year is lower than the median value (<50p) and 
higher than the first quartile value (>25p) for that year iv) Minimalist, when a company’s ITR_SCORE 
in a year is lower than the first quartile value (<25p) for that year.  
The percentage distribution of companies in the four ITR groups across countries and industries 
shows a higher percentage of companies from Spain, France, and Germany, and from Oil and Gas, 
Utilities, and Basic material industries, belonging to the Holistic group. Likewise, higher percentage 
of companies in the Minimalist category belongs to Luxembourg, Italy, and Ireland, and to 
Technology, Financials, and Healthcare industries9. This suggests some level of preference towards 
integrating financial and non-financial information across countries in the Euro STOXX 600 index 
and based on the industry the company is operating. 
Table 4 presents the results of univariate analysis, where the four ITR groups are compared 
across a set of companies’ characteristics (i.e. performance, size, risk, governance, and others). The 
median value of each variable for each group (i.e. Holistic, Integrated, Conservative, and Minimalist) 
is compared to all other groups collectively using a non-parametric k-sample test on the equality of 
                                                          
8 Year 2015 reports a lower number of observations as at the time of data collection (August 2016) a lower number of 
ITR_SCORE values was estimated and/or reported in Datastream. 
9 The figures representing the distribution of companies in the four ITR groups across countries and industries are not 
reported in the manuscript but available on request. 
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medians10. From Table 4, it is interesting to note that companies belonging to a specific group report 
median values significantly different from the others on a wide number of firm-specific variables. In 
particular, Holistic and Minimalist companies present distinctive characteristics for most of the 
variables analysed, suggesting the existence of different extent of integration related to companies’ 
characteristics. Although limited in its ability to explain tangible differences across groups, the 
univariate analysis presents first-hand information for identifying distinctive features of ITR. 
Consequently, a detailed description of the four ITR groups is provided below. 
[Table 4 near here] 
Holistic ITR: Holistic companies have levels of ITR_SCORE in the fourth quartile; these are 
the companies in the top 25% of the distribution. Results from Table 4 show that Holistic companies 
are significantly different from the others in terms of performance, where absolute variables (i.e. 
RETAINED_EARNINGS, EBIT) and environmental performance (ENV_PERF) have higher median 
values, while relative variables (i.e. ROA, ROE, ROS, TOBIN_Q) report slightly lower median values. 
Holistic companies have higher size across all the measures used (i.e. EMPLOYEE, SALES, 
TOT_ASSETS, MARKETCAP), larger boards (BOARD_SIZE), more research and development 
investment (R&D), higher number of analysts following (ANALYSTS) and are older firms 
(FIRM_AGE). Also, Holistic companies present higher concentration in some industries, i.e. Oil and 
Gas, Utilities, and Basic Materials, and countries, i.e. Spain, France, and Germany. 
Minimalist ITR: Minimalist companies have levels of ITR_SCORE lower than the first quartile 
value (<25p) and are in the bottom 25% of the distribution. Minimalist companies significantly differ 
from others as they report lower absolute performance values (i.e. RETAINED_EARNINGS, EBIT) 
and environmental performance (ENV_PERF), while slightly higher values of performance ratios (i.e. 
ROA, ROE, ROS, TOBIN_Q). These companies are smaller, in terms of size (EMPLOYEE, SALES, 
TOT_ASSETS, MARKET_CAP), have smaller boards (BOARD_SIZE), lower research and 
development investments (R&D), fewer analysts following (ANALYSTS), and are younger firms 
(FIRM_AGE). Minimalist companies have higher concentration in Technology, Healthcare, and 
Financials industries, and in specific countries, i.e. Luxembourg, Italy, and Ireland.  
Integrated and Conservative ITR: Integrated companies have levels of ITR_SCORE higher than 
the median value and lower than the third quartile value and are the companies in the top 50-75% of 
the distribution. Conservative companies have levels of ITR_SCORE higher than the first quartile but 
lower than the median value, and are the companies in the bottom 25-50% of the distribution. 
Integrated and Conservative companies represent the two intermediate groups, thus tend to report 
characteristics similar to the closest group, i.e. Integrated with Holistic, Conservative with 
                                                          
10 The non-parametric test for equality of median between unmatched data is estimated using the chi square test statistics 
computed using the continuity correction (Mann & Whitney, 1947). 
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Minimalist. It is worth noting that, moving from Holistic to Minimalist, variables like size, research 
and development, number of analysts, firm’s age, and absolute performance measures progressively 
decrease, while other variables show mixed results. 
Although the univariate analysis represents a good statistical tool to draw broad understanding 
of companies’ level of integration and their idiosyncratic characteristics, it does not allow to draw 
inferences on the causal relationship. This requires further analysis to draw reliable conclusions which 
is presented in the Section 4.3. 
 
4.2 ITR and Switching Behaviour 
Figure 1 shows the switching behaviour of the sample firms by reporting the average percentage of 
companies in the same ITR group or switching from one to another over the period 2002-2015. It is 
interesting to note that a high percentage of Holistic (72%) and Minimalist (75%) firms maintain their 
level of integration from one year to another. Among the other groups, companies tend to switch 
between Holistic-Integrated (22%) and Minimalist-Conservative (17%), while it is rare for companies 
to switch from Holistic to Minimalist, and vice versa. 
[Figure 1 near here] 
These results point towards consistency in ITR levels; over time companies tend to maintain it 
or at times switch to the closest group. In doing so, integration seems to be a manifestation of the 
corporate culture and based on what a firm has done in the past (routine). Similarly, the level of 
integration is also related to what other firms do, especially in the same industry (imitation). These 
findings point towards the new institutional theory framework and, specifically, the concept of 
isomorphism, according to which organizations experience pressures that lead them to adopt rules 
and structures to enhance legitimacy (Deephouse, 1996; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Organizations 
become isomorphic and tend to adopt similar rules and structures of companies in a similar position 
(De Villiers & Alexander, 2014). Among the three types of isomorphic forces identified by DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983), i.e. mimetic, coercive, and normative, our findings on ITR and switching 
behaviour seem to confirm the mimetic aspect: large multinational companies benchmark against 
their peers and smaller companies benchmark against industry leaders (De Villiers & Alexander, 
2014) thus leading to imitation. A switching behaviour characterized by routine and imitation 
suggests that integration requires a ‘one-off’ investment; in other words, once a company achieves a 




4.3 Regression Results 
Table 5 reports the results of the panel data random effect regression (Panel A) and the ordered 
logistic panel data random effect regression (Panel B) to investigate what drives the ITR levels11. 
Findings from model 1 (Table 5, Panel A) show that companies’ size (SIZE) and leverage 
(LEVERAGE) have a positive and significant impact on the level of integration, while company’s 
performance (ROE) reports a positive but non-significant impact. The ability to manage the 
environmental performance and reduce environmental risks (ENV_PERF) seems to be a determining 
factor leading to higher companies’ integration level as well as companies operating in environmental 
sensitive industries (IND_SENS) tend to exhibit higher integration levels. Among governance 
characteristics, bigger size of the board (BOARD_SIZE) is found to have a significant positive impact 
on ITR score, while no significant result is found for the other governance variables (BOARD_MEET, 
BOARD_INDEPEND, STRATEGIC_SHARE). Macroeconomic variables GDP and 
MARKET_INDEX are positively related to ITR score; similarly, the level of investor protection of the 
country where the company operates (INV_PROT) seems to facilitate higher integration levels, while 
the country environmental performance index (EPI_INDEX), the World Bank country measures 
(VOICE_ACC_WB, REG_QUAL_WB, GOV_EFF_WB) and media freedom (FREEDOM) report non-
significant results. In Table 5, Panel B, the dependent variable is replaced by an ordinal variable 
assuming values 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively for companies in the fourth, third, second, and first 
quartile of the ITR_SCORE distribution. Results from the ordered logistic panel data random effect 
regression reported in Panel B are in line with the findings reported in Panel A. It is interesting to 
note that, in the ordered regression specification, the variables BOARD_MEET, EPI_INDEX and 
some country variables report significant results. However, in order to provide an in-depth discussion 
of these findings, and their implications, it is crucial to first estimate the results from the regressions 
in Eq. (2), (3), (4), and (5).  
[Table 5 near here] 
Table 6 reports the results of the logit panel data random effect regressions that investigate 
the factors affecting the probability that a company has a Holistic (Table 6, columns 1-2), Integrated 
(Table 6, columns 3-4), Conservative (Table 6, columns 5-6) or a Minimalist (Table 6, columns 7-8) 
integration level. 
[Table 6 near here] 
Consistent with H1, firms with greater size (SIZE) are more likely to have either a Holistic or an 
Integrated level of integration, and this is in line with previous literature showing that size is a 
                                                          
11 In Table 5, both for Panel A and Panel B, we present the findings of a core model (columns 1 and 2) and an extended 




significant predictor of companies’ disclosure strategies (i.e. Cowen et al., 1987; Frías-Aceituno et 
al., 2013, 2014; Patten, 1991, 2002; Qiu et al., 2016). Larger companies tend to receive more attention 
from the general public, are under pressure to exhibit their social responsibility, and have a wider 
stakeholder base, compared to smaller companies which may have lower public pressure and fewer 
stakeholders (Cowen et al., 1987). In line with these results, firms with smaller size are found to be 
more likely to adopt either Conservative or Minimalist ITR level. The nature of the industry 
(IND_SENS) is also a decisive factor affecting ITR levels; firms in environmentally-sensitive sectors 
(i.e. chemicals, electricity, gas, waste water, alternative energy, forestry and paper) may feel higher 
pressure and thus exhibit higher probability to adopt a Holistic level of integration (Cormier et al., 
2005; Cowen et al., 1987; Patten, 2002). These results are consistent with the predictions of the 
legitimacy theory, according to which corporations will do whatever they regard as necessary in order 
to preserve their image as a legitimate business and can even change the type of disclosure as a 
legitimising strategy (De Villiers & van Staden, 2006; O’Donovan, 2002; Patten, 1991, 2002). The 
implementation of IR results in stronger internal communications, requires managers to engage in IT 
and develop new ways of measuring, managing and disclosing information (De Villiers et al., 2017b). 
Hence, firms with more social pressure are more likely to consider reporting in an integrated manner 
that jointly accounts for environmental, human, social, and natural principles. Contrary to previous 
literature (i.e. Grant, 1991; Qiu et al., 2016; Russo & Fouts, 1997), performance variable (ROE) 
reports a non-significant coefficient, thus profitability (H2) is not found to be a decisive factor that 
drives management to undertake higher levels of integration in day to day decision making (as in 
Cormier et al., 2005). Highly levered firms (LEVERAGE) are also found to be more likely to engage 
in high level of integration, i.e. a firm with more debt, and therefore higher riskiness, may feel obliged 
to explain how the funds are used. The ability of a company to avoid environmental risks and 
capitalize on environmental opportunities to generate long term value creation (ENV_PERF) results 
into higher levels of integration. Environmental performance is increasingly an important issue for 
investors, potential investors and other stakeholders (De Villiers & van Staden, 2011); our results 
show that the better a company is able to manage its impact on living and non-living natural systems, 
including the air, land and water, as well as complete ecosystems, the more probable would be to 
have higher levels of integration in daily decision-making processes. Among governance variables, 
firms with bigger board size (BOARD_SIZE) and more meetings (BOARD_MEET) are more likely to 
engage in higher integration, therefore enhancing accountability with stakeholders (Lai et al., 2018), 
while board composition (BOARD_INDEPEND) and CEO compensation (CEO_SHARE) do not turn 
out to be significant factors for Holistic level of integration. A joint analysis of the size and activity 
of the board suggests that the level of integration benefits from large boards, that may imply directors 
with more varied skills and experience, as well as a higher number of meetings; on the other hand, 
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board independence does not seem to play a key role in supporting integration (Frìas-Aceituno et al., 
2013; Prado-Lorenzo & García-Sánchez, 2010). Thus, H3 and H4 are supported by these findings, 
while it is not the case for H5. 
However, there are few notable differences in the results when comparing the predictors of the 
probability of belonging to the Holistic group with those of the Minimalist. Indeed, the coefficients 
of SIZE, LEVERAGE, and BOARD_SIZE become negative and significant, implying that firms with 
smaller size, lower level of debt to equity and smaller corporate boards are more likely to adopt a 
Minimalist approach. Looking at the companies that exhibit lower integration levels (i.e. Conservative 
and Minimalist), we can observe a negative relationship with the dependent variable for size (negative 
and significant) and performance (negative but not significant). This seems to suggest that size is a 
crucial factor in determining the level of integration in decision making processes; large firms are in 
a better position to do integrated thinking and reporting as they have the required resources and they 
can make all the efforts (i.e. “boots and all”) to bring integration within the organization; on the other 
side, small firms simply don’t do it because they do not seem to have the necessary resources, 
capacity, maybe incentives, to be more integrated. Similar results are found for board size and board 
meetings (negative and significant for Minimalist or Conservative) suggesting that the involvement 
of managers with sufficient experience and diversity, which are common with large boards, along 
with increased supervision and control are linked to higher integration levels. When CEO 
compensation is linked to shareholder returns (CEO_SHARE), companies seem to exhibit a lower 
probability of adopting a Minimalist ITR level. This may serve as a motivation to induce CEO towards 
higher level of integration thereby addressing any potential principle-agent problem. Despite previous 
literature shows that active boards are more effective in performing supervisory functions, leading to 
lower information asymmetry and greater interest in disclosing information to stakeholders (Frías-
Aceituno et al., 2013), our findings show that only the size of the board and the number of board 
meetings represent significant factors affecting the level of integration. Integration emerges as a 
journey, characterised by challenges, success, strengths and weaknesses (Rinaldi et al., 2018); our 
analysis focuses on the phase of idea production and shows that, although the journey can lead to 
different forms of resistance, it has a transformative potential that may lead to a more integrated 
conception of value (McNally & Maroun, 2018). 
The macroeconomic environment also plays a key role in defining the level of integration; in 
particular, the higher the economic growth (GDP) and market performance (MARKET_INDEX), the 
greater the probability of adopting a Holistic integration level in line with García-Sánchez et al. 
(2013), Jensen and Berg (2012), Vaz et al. (2016). Following the arguments presented by De Villiers 
and Marques (2016), firms in countries that show a greater commitment to environmental issues could 
be more likely to provide more information as a result of higher levels of stakeholder pressure; 
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however, at the same time, in more environmentally committed countries, environmental issues may 
lead to negative financial consequences. Our findings point towards the first interpretation for the 
Minimalist companies; indeed, companies operating in countries with higher levels of environmental 
commitment (EPI_INDEX) tend to have Minimalist (or Conservative) levels of integration; on the 
other side, Holistic (or Integrated) companies seem less sensitive to stakeholder environmental 
pressure at country level. While previous literature shows IR companies are more likely to originate 
from countries with higher investor protection (Jensen & Berg, 2012), our findings show no 
significant effect of the level of investor protection at country level (INV_PROT) on companies’ level 
of integration in their internal processes. The democracy and freedom of the citizens in a country 
(VOICE_ACC_WB12) seems to have a positive and significant effect on companies’ internal decision-
making processes, resulting into higher levels of integration. 
 
4.4 Robustness Checks 
To ensure the reliability of the results and avoid potential biases specifically related to industry 
classifications and the period of analysis, further robustness checks are undertaken. First, the 
regression models are re-estimated for non-financial firms (Subsample 1: Non-financial firms) to 
account for potential bias resulting from considering financial and non-financial companies jointly. 
Second, the analysis is repeated across different sub-periods, following the global financial crisis 
(Subsample 2: After 2007) and following the introduction of the IIRC framework (Subsample 3: After 
2013). These robustness tests are reported for companies in the Holistic and Minimalist groups, as 
these groups displayed the most significant differences based on the previous analysis.  
Results are provided in Table 7. The subsample analysis confirms that the results are robust 
across the different timelines, and that recent years exhibit consistency across drivers of firm ITR 
levels. Overall the robustness tests point towards reliability of estimates and are mostly consistent 
with prior evidence (Table 5 and 6). 
 [Table 7 near here] 
 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
This article extends current knowledge in the field of integrated thinking and reporting by providing 
new empirical evidence on the nature of ITR and its determinants for a sample of European listed 
companies over 2002-2015. We complement previous studies in the field (i.e. Frías-Aceituno et al., 
                                                          
12 In unreported tables, the variable VOICE_ACC_WB is replaced by, in alternative, REG_QUAL_WB, GOV_EFF_WB, 
and FREEDOM to avoid multicollinearity issues. Variables are described in Table 2. Findings are consistent with the 
results displayed in Table 6. 
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2013, 2014; Vaz et al., 2016) by measuring the level of integration (ITR level) as companies’ 
management commitment towards integrating financial and extra-financial aspects (as in Maniora, 
2015; Serafeim, 2015; Venter et al., 2016); this allows capturing different levels of integration, 
therefore distinctive ITR groups and their evolution over time. Through a comprehensive quantitative 
analysis, we extend the analysis of ITR determinants across the distinctive ITR levels, thus expanding 
the existing literature on the determinants of ITR practices and contributing to the debate on the future 
developments of ITR. 
In our empirical analysis, we categorise firms into four ITR groups – Holistic, Integrated, 
Conservative, and Minimalist. Each of these has its own distinctive features and expresses a 
company’s commitment towards the integration of financial and non-financial aspects, that is higher 
for Holistic companies (lowest for Minimalist). Results from univariate analysis show that companies 
with a Holistic or Integrated level tend to have bigger size, larger board, higher environmental 
performance, higher number of analysts following and are older firms. Differently, companies 
adopting a Minimalist or Conservative level are smaller in size, have smaller boards, lower 
environmental performance, lower R&D investment and are relatively younger firms. Additionally, 
integration levels are also found to be concentrated by industry and country. The analysis of the 
switching behaviour shows that companies’ ITR levels tend to be mostly consistent over time; in 
doing so, integration in thinking and reporting appears to be the result of routine and imitation. These 
findings point towards the concept of isomorphism, according to which organizations experience 
pressures that lead them to adopt rules and structures to enhance legitimacy (Deephouse, 1996; De 
Villiers & Alexander, 2014; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Our findings on ITR and switching 
behaviour seem to confirm the mimetic aspect of isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983): large 
multinational companies benchmark against their peers and smaller companies benchmark against 
industry leaders (De Villiers & Alexander, 2014) thus leading to imitation. This is interesting from 
both company and policy perspective, as it seems to suggest that once a more integrated approach in 
thinking and reporting is achieved, it would tend to be maintained over time. These initial results have 
then been validated by more robust methodology to infer cause and effect relationship. 
The findings from the regression analysis show that firms’ behaviour towards ITR can be 
explained in the context of legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory. Distinctive factors are found to 
significantly drive companies’ choices of integration. Companies with greater size, leverage, board 
size and meetings, as well as companies operating in sensitive industries and with higher 
environmental performance, are more likely to exhibit a Holistic (or Integrated) level of integration, 
while Minimalist (or Conservative) is driven by the same characteristics but in the opposite direction. 
Therefore, the research hypotheses related to company size (H1), board size (H3) and board meetings 
(H4) are confirmed by the research findings, while the remaining research hypotheses related to 
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profitability (H2) and board independence (H5) do not find support in the empirical analysis. 
Moreover, operating in countries with better economic growth levels, market performance, and 
citizens freedom, but lower environmental commitment, significantly contribute to higher levels of 
integration. This suggests that a company’s level of integration is the result of a legitimation process, 
especially for bigger companies (De Villiers & van Staden, 2006; O’Donovan, 2002), i.e. bigger 
corporations are more in the spotlight of public opinion, receive public pressure and, therefore, will 
do whatever they regard as necessary in order to preserve their image of a legitimate business (De 
Villiers & van Staden, 2006). It is interesting to note that the findings are in opposite directions when 
comparing Holistic and Minimalist companies. It seems to suggest that large firms are in a better 
position to do integrated thinking and reporting as they have the required resources and they can make 
all the efforts (i.e. “boots and all”) to bring integration within the organization; on the other side, 
small firms simply don’t do it because they don’t seem to have the necessary resources, capacity, 
maybe incentives, to be more integrated. Similar results are found for board size and board meetings 
suggesting that experienced and diverse boards, which are common with large boards, along with 
increased supervision and control lead to higher integration levels. These findings are confirmed 
across several model specifications and found to be robust across various sub sample analyses. 
These results have some interesting implications for the corporate (and financial) reporting 
debate. This study offers significant evidence of the existence of different levels of integration in 
response to the need for transparency and improved communication, concluding that there is no 
unique recipe for achieving integration. The identification of the drivers of ITR levels, from Holistic 
to Minimalist, has the potential to inspire companies’ choices alongside policymakers’ initiatives, by 
identifying which levers should be pulled to achieve the desired level of integration. Moreover, the 
results point to the importance of legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory to explain integration, 
thus contributing to the theoretical framework on IR and IT research. Most importantly, as part of the 
debate on the future developments of IR, the results from this study suggest the need for a tailored 
approach rather than a one size fits all. Indeed, companies can have different levels of ITR and this 
is found to be driven by a variety of factors at company, governance, and country level. 
From a practical perspective, our findings suggest that companies experience their own 
integration journey and there is no unique recipe for integration, i.e. one size does not fit all. This 
needs to be acknowledged by managers, who would be interested in understanding the role of both 
internal and external factors in affecting integration; by regulators, as future regulations need to be 
tailored according to company characteristics as well as contextual factors; by policymakers, for any 
future initiatives in the field of IT and IR; by capital market participants, who can use these results to 
inform their decisions. We also acknowledge the limitations of our study, that focuses on European 
listed companies (only) and a defined (although wide) period of investigation; similar to other studies, 
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our measure of ITR, provided by Thomson Reuters Asset4, can be a limiting factor. It has the 
important advantage of ensuring objectivity (reducing any subjectivity from variables measured 
directly by the researchers) and allowing a comprehensive analysis, although limiting the possibility 
to follow the entire data collection process; however, we are confident that the informative power of 
this measure overcomes any potential limitation, and allows conducting an analysis that otherwise 
could not be done. Future research can expand into investigating the phenomenon across different 
geographic areas and the context of non-voluntary adoption of IR, as well as testing alternative 
measures and looking at non-observable characteristics. Moreover, findings from this study also open 
further opportunities to explore the specialization effects of ITR practices, i.e. by size, sector, and 
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Panel A. Country N %  Panel B. Industry N % 
Austria 8 1.37  Basic Materials 43 7.38 
Belgium 14 2.40  Consumer Goods 71 12.18 
Czech Republic 2 0.34  Consumer Services 77 13.21 
Denmark 19 3.26  Financials 135 23.16 
Finland 15 2.57  Health Care 40 6.86 
France 77 13.21  Industrials 128 21.96 
Germany 62 10.63  Oil & Gas 19 3.26 
Greece 3 0.51  Technology 22 3.77 
Ireland 12 2.06  Telecommunications 22 3.77 
Italy 29 4.97  Utilities 26 4.46 
Luxembourg 7 1.20  Total 583 100.00 
Netherlands 27 4.63     
Norway 9 1.54     
Portugal 4 0.69     
Spain 30 5.15     
Sweden 42 7.20     
Switzerland 53 9.09     
United Kingdom 170 29.16     
Total 583 100.00     
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics on the sample distribution. The sample is composed of 583 





Variables description and data source 
Category Variable name Description Data source 
Integration ITR_SCORE Integrated Thinking and Reporting Score (percentage between 0 and 100) – a company's 
management commitment and effectiveness towards the creation of an overarching vision 
and strategy integrating financial and extra-financial aspects (see Appendix). 
Thomson Reuters Asset4  
(mnemonic CGVS) 
 HOLISTIC Dummy variable, =1 when ITR_SCORE is higher than the third quartile value. Authors’ estimation from Asset4 
 INTEGRATED Dummy variable, =1 when ITR_SCORE is lower than the third quartile value and higher than 
the median value. 
Authors’ estimation from Asset4 
 CONSERVATIVE Dummy variable, =1 when ITR_SCORE is lower than the median value and higher than the 
first quartile value. 
Authors’ estimation from Asset4 
 MINIMALIST Dummy variable, =1 when ITR_SCORE is lower than the first quartile value. Authors’ estimation from Asset4 
Performance ROA Return on assets – ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. Datastream 
 ROE Return on equity – ratio of net income to common equity. Datastream 
 ROS Return on sales – the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to net sales. Datastream 
 TOBIN_Q Tobin Q – the ratio of total market value of a firm to its total asset value. Datastream 
 RETAINED_EARNINGS Retained earnings – after tax earnings not distributed as dividends to shareholders or allocated 
to a reserve account. 
Datastream 
 EBIT Earnings before interest expense and income taxes. Datastream 
 ENV_PERF Company’s environmental performance – a company's impact on living and non-living 
natural systems, including the air, land and water, as well as complete ecosystems. 
Thomson Reuters Asset4 
Size EMPLOYEE Total number of employees. Datastream 
 SALES Net sales – gross sales and other operating revenue less discounts, returns, and allowances. Datastream 
 SIZE Logarithm of SALES. Datastream 
 TOT_ASSETS Total assets – sum of total current assets, long term receivables, investment in unconsolidated 
subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and equipment and other assets. 
Datastream 
 MARKET_CAP Market capitalization – Market Price Year End * Common Shares Outstanding. Datastream 
Risk ZSCORE Z score – sum of firm return on asset and equity to asset ratio divided by the standard deviation 
of last 4 years return on asset. 
Authors’ estimation from 
Datastream 
 LEVERAGE Total debt divided by total assets. Datastream 
Governance BOARD_SIZE Size of the board of directors. Datastream 
 BOARD_ATTEND Average board meeting attendance. Datastream 
 BOARD_MEET Number of board meetings. Datastream 
 BOARD_INDEPEND Percentage of independent directors. Datastream 
 CEO_SHARE Dummy variable, =1 when CEO compensation is linked to shareholder return. Datastream 
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 STRATEGIC_SHARE Strategic number of shares – percentage of total shares in issue held strategically and not 
available to ordinary shareholders (holdings of 5% or more). 
Datastream 
Other variables R&D Total amount of research and development investments. Datastream 
 ANALYSTS Total number of analysts making recommendations for the security. IBES 
 FIRM_AGE Firm age – number of years since company founded. Datastream 
 IND_SENS Industry sensitivity – dummy variable, =1 for firms operating in environmentally sensitive 
industries, 0 otherwise. Sensitive industries are identified by the SIC codes described in De 
Villiers and Marques (2016).  
 
Macroeconomic  GDP Gross domestic product collected at country level. Bloomberg 
 MARKET_INDEX STOXX Europe 600 market index return. Bloomberg 
 EPI_INDEX Environmental performance index – a measure of environmental responsibility by country. 
Values can range between 0 and 100. 
Yale Center for Environmental 
Law and Policy 
 INV_PROT The strength of investor protection index is an average of 3 indices – the extent of disclosure 
index, the extent of director liability index, and the ease of shareholder suit index. 
World Bank 
 VOICE_ACC_WB Voice and Accountability – reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are 
able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom 
of association, and a free media. 
World Bank 
 REG_QUAL_WB Regulatory quality – reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. 
World Bank 
 GOV_EFF_WB Government Effectiveness – reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality 
of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment 
to such policies. 
World Bank 
 FREEDOM Freedom of press - the Index ranks 180 countries according to the level of freedom available 
to journalists, based on an evaluation of pluralism, independence of the media, quality of 
legislative framework and safety of journalists in each country. 
Reporters Without Borders 
Notes: This table describes the variables used in the analysis, including definition and source. Integration variables are collected and built from Thomson Reuters 
Asset4. Firm specific (performance, size, risk, and other) and governance variables are sourced and built from Datastream and Thomson Reuters. Macroeconomic 
variables are collected from Bloomberg, World Bank, Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, and Reporters Without Borders. All firm specific variables 





Integrated thinking and reporting score (ITR_SCORE) 
Year N Mean Min 25% 50% 75% Max 
2002 264 60.19 21.60 21.60 62.07 92.04 98.62 
2003 268 62.07 13.18 28.52 68.20 90.91 98.17 
2004 373 63.51 12.73 21.91 71.58 95.64 98.64 
2005 449 65.68 13.47 35.71 76.56 96.45 97.99 
2006 456 65.78 14.52 36.56 78.04 95.57 97.63 
2007 481 66.03 12.58 36.06 82.88 93.46 95.55 
2008 490 68.70 11.05 40.74 86.50 93.27 95.25 
2009 498 71.97 10.90 51.28 88.90 93.43 94.73 
2010 514 73.80 9.72 58.07 88.55 93.06 94.40 
2011 529 73.06 9.11 57.24 88.01 92.38 94.82 
2012 539 73.13 8.66 58.36 87.69 91.69 94.51 
2013 548 73.97 8.67 59.68 87.69 91.75 94.54 
2014 570 72.95 8.42 58.91 86.91 92.20 94.88 
2015 339 71.98 9.73 57.16 87.32 92.72 94.76 
Overall (2002-2015) 6318 69.56 8.42 46.57 85.32 92.77 98.64 
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics of ITR_SCORE for each year over the period investigated and 






ITR Level HOLISTIC INTEGRATED CONSERVATIVE MINIMALIST 
Integration         
ITR_SCORE 93.91*** 90.71*** 70.54*** 21.67*** 
Performance         
ROA 6.7*** 6.9*** 7.93*** 7.89*** 
ROE 13.07* 12.97* 14.25*** 13.62 
ROS 12.95 11.52*** 12.08** 14.75*** 
TOBIN_Q 1.24*** 1.29*** 1.4*** 1.46*** 
RETAINED_EARNINGS 3.76M*** 2.45M*** 0.97M*** 0.69M*** 
EBIT 1.62M*** 1.03M*** 0.41M*** 0.3M*** 
ENV_PERF 92.26*** 89.82*** 76.84*** 32.71*** 
Size         
EMPLOYEE 48.9K*** 31.8K*** 12.8K*** 6.4K*** 
SALES 13.2M*** 9.6M*** 3.5M*** 1.78M*** 
TOT_ASSETS 23.4M*** 13.6M*** 4.6M*** 3.4M*** 
MARKET_CAP 13M*** 8.5M*** 3.9M*** 2.94M*** 
Risk     
ZSCORE 4.32** 4 4.01 3.77** 
LEVERAGE 0.26 0.26** 0.25 0.23*** 
Governance         
BOARD_SIZE 12*** 12*** 10*** 9*** 
BOARD_ATTEND 95*** 95 95 96** 
BOARD_MEET 8** 9*** 8* 8*** 
BOARD_INDEPEND 54.55*** 55.56*** 50* 50*** 
STRATEGIC_SHARE 16*** 21 22 25*** 
Other variables         
R&D 185K*** 108K*** 62K*** 50K*** 
ANALYSTS 25*** 22*** 17*** 13*** 
FIRM_AGE 89*** 83** 69*** 60*** 
Notes: This table reports the results of the univariate analysis presented in Section 3.3 and discussed in Section 
4.1. Variables are described in Table 2. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 





Panel data regression results: the determinants of ITR score 
Panel A: dependent variable ITR_SCORE         
Variable  
Panel data RE  Panel data RE  Panel data RE  Panel data RE  Panel data RE  
Coeff.  Rob.SE  Coeff.  Rob.SE  Coeff.  Rob.SE  Coeff.  Rob.SE  Coeff.  Rob.SE  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  
SIZE  2.586*** 0.462 2.701*** 0.462 2.690*** 0.460 2.714*** 0.457 2.712*** 0.459 
ROE  0.002 0.012 0.001 0.013 0.001 0.013 0.001 0.013 0.001 0.013 
BOARD_SIZE  0.351** 0.136 0.314** 0.144 0.325** 0.144 0.266* 0.0143 0.298** 0.141 
BOARD_MEET  0.135 0.096 0.124 0.095 0.127 0.094 0.102 0.095 0.118 0.095 
BOARD_INDEPEND  0.005 0.018 0.019 0.017 0.019 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.017 
LEVERAGE  8.357*** 3.208 7.807** 3.022 7.768** 2.998 7.288** 3.032 7.690** 3.011 
STRATEGIC_SHARE  -0.014 0.023 0.005 0.021 0.005 0.021 0.005 0.021 0.004 0.022 
CEO_SHARE  2.305** 1.049 2.084** 1.031 2.066** 1.034 2.091** 1.029 2.104** 1.035 
ENV_PERF 0.566*** 0.026 0.596*** 0.027 0.597*** 0.027 0.594*** 0.027 0.596*** 0.026 
IND_SENS 5.068*** 1.413 4.821*** 1.368 4.816*** 1.365 4.794*** 1.370 4.808*** 1.367 
GDP  0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
MARKET_INDEX  3.255*** 0.950 2.996*** 0.944 3.101*** 0.943 2.894** 0.930 2.985*** 0.954 
EPI_INDEX -0.042 0.050 -0.042 0.048 -0.045 0.047 -0.029 0.049 -0.052 0.075 
INV_PROT   1.035** 0.495 0.948** 0.462 1.012** 0.487 1.022** 0.489 
VOICE_ACC_WB   1.852 3.944       
REG_QUAL_WB  
   1.469 1.871     
GOV_EFF_WB       -2.482 1.608   
FREEDOM         0.013 0.053 
Intercept  -17.115** 7.743 -29.875*** 11.396 -28.663*** 9.008 -22.859** 8.608 -26.316*** 9.911 
N  4,130  3,825  3,825  3,825  3,825  





Panel B: dependent variable ordered ITR_SCORE        
Variable  
Panel data RE ordered Panel data RE ordered Panel data RE ordered Panel data RE ordered Panel data RE ordered 
Coeff.  Rob.SE  Coeff.  Rob.SE  Coeff.  Rob.SE  Coeff.  Rob.SE  Coeff.  Rob.SE  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  
SIZE  0.633*** 0.09 0.778*** 0.098 0.775*** 0.098 0.792*** 0.098 0.797*** 0.099 
ROE  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
BOARD_SIZE  0.048* 0.026 0.060* 0.031 0.066** 0.031 0.053* 0.031 0.051* 0.03 
BOARD_MEET  0.028* 0.016 0.039** 0.017 0.040** 0.017 0.038** 0.017 0.036** 0.017 
BOARD_INDEPEND  -0.002 0.003 0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 
LEVERAGE  1.484** 0.608 1.717*** 0.650 1.680*** 0.641 1.716*** 0.653 1.680** 0.650 
STRATEGIC_SHARE  0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 
CEO_SHARE  0.061 0.179 0.096 0.192 0.090 0.190 0.108 0.190 0.098 0.192 
ENV_PERF 0.064*** 0.005 0.075*** 0.005 0.076*** 0.005 0.075*** 0.005 0.075*** 0.005 
IND_SENS 1.054*** 0.281 1.071*** 0.297 1.062*** 0.297 1.060*** 0.299 1.057*** 0.299 
GDP  0.001** 0.001 0.001*** 0.001 0.001** 0.001 0.001** 0.001 0.001** 0.001 
MARKET_INDEX  0.545*** 0.163 0.483*** 0.184 0.555*** 0.183 0.517*** 0.182 0.524*** 0.185 
EPI_INDEX -0.033*** 0.009 -0.033*** 0.009 -0.035*** 0.009 -0.034*** 0.009 -0.026* 0.013 
INV_PROT   0.078 0.088 0.021 0.085 0.069 0.087 0.069 0.087 
VOICE_ACC_WB   1.432* 0.790       
REG_QUAL_WB     0.963** 0.375     
GOV_EFF_WB       0.293 0.301   
FREEDOM         -0.008 0.01 
N  4,130  3,825  3,825  3,825  3,825  
Log pseudolikelihood  -3647.167  -3213.929  -3211.471  -3216.287  -3216.423  
Notes: This table reports the results of the panel data regressions on the determinants of ITR score. Panel A reports regression coefficients and robust standard 
errors for the panel data random effect regression, with ITR_SCORE as dependent variable (Eq.1). Panel B reports regression coefficients and robust standard errors 
for the ordered logistic panel data random effect regression, where the dependent variable is replaced by a categorical variable representing the four different ITR 
levels. In both Panel A and Panel B, we present the findings of a core model (columns 1 and 2) and an extended model (columns 3 to 10). In the extended model, 





Panel data regression results: the determinants of ITR levels 
Variable  
HOLISTIC INTEGRATED CONSERVATIVE MINIMALIST 
Coeff.  Marg.eff. Coeff.  Marg.eff. Coeff.  Marg.eff. Coeff.  Marg.eff. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
SIZE  0.699*** 0.076*** 0.255*** 0.037*** -0.630*** -0.076*** -0.740*** -0.043*** 
  (0.105) (0.010) (0.071) (0.010) (0.087) (0.012) (0.132) (0.008) 
ROE  -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
BOARD_SIZE  0.083*** 0.009*** -0.034 -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 -0.076** -0.004** 
  (0.028) (0.003) (0.021) (0.003) (0.025) (0.003) (0.038) (0.002) 
BOARD_MEET  0.040* 0.004* 0.012 0.002 -0.031* -0.004* -0.032 -0.002 
  (0.022) (0.002) (0.017) (0.002) (0.018) (0.002) (0.025) (0.001) 
BOARD_INDEPEND  0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
  (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
LEVERAGE  0.934 0.101 0.968** 0.140** -1.209** -0.147** -1.803** -0.104** 
  (0.693) (0.075) (0.475) (0.069) (0.545) (0.067) (0.778) (0.045) 
STRATEGIC_SHARE  -0.005 -0.001 0.009*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.001 
  (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) 
CEO_SHARE  -0.019 -0.002 0.359** 0.052** -0.110 -0.013 -0.485* -0.028* 
  (0.195) (0.021) (0.147) (0.021) (0.170) (0.021) (0.253) (0.015) 
ENV_PERF 0.078*** 0.009*** 0.039*** 0.006*** 0.005 0.001 -0.078*** -0.004*** 
  (0.007) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) 
IND_SENS 0.657** 0.071** 0.259 0.038 -0.485* -0.059* -1.033** -0.060** 
  (0.322) (0.034) (0.203) (0.029) (0.283) (0.035) (0.415) (0.024) 
GDP  0.001** 0.001*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
MARKET_INDEX  0.646** 0.070** 0.008 0.001 -0.513** -0.062** -0.077 -0.004 
  (0.272) (0.029) (0.216) (0.031) (0.231) (0.028) (0.343) (0.020) 
EPI_INDEX -0.033*** -0.004*** -0.007 -0.001 0.027** 0.003** 0.036** 0.002** 
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  (0.012) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.011) (0.001) (0.016) (0.001) 
INV_PROT 0.068 0.007 0.003 0.001 0.103 0.012 -0.183* -0.011* 
  (0.092) (0.010) (0.060) (0.009) (0.073) (0.009) (0.099) (0.006) 
VOICE_ACC_WB  a 2.071*** 0.225*** -0.641 -0.093 -0.789 -0.096 -0.023 -0.001 
  (0.756) (0.081) (0.520) (0.075) (0.644) (0.078) (0.963) (0.056) 
Intercept  -22.624***  -7.409***  6.918***  15.024***  
  (2.234)  (1.458)  (1.730)  (2.626)  
N  3,825 3,825 3,825 3,825 3,825 3,825 3,825 3,825 
Log pseudolikelihood  -1391.362  -1803.576  -1688.463  -894.063  
Notes: This table reports the results of the logit panel data random effect regression models Eq. (2), (3), (4), and (5) that investigate the determinants of ITR levels. 
Columns 1-2 reports regression coefficients, marginal effects, and standard errors in parenthesis for Eq. (2). Columns 3-4 report regression coefficients, marginal 
effects, and standard errors in parenthesis for Eq. (3). Columns 5-6 reports regression coefficients, marginal effects, and standard errors in parenthesis for Eq. (4). 
Columns 7-8 report regression coefficients, marginal effects, and standard errors in parenthesis for Eq. (5). Variables are described in Table 2. *, **, *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
a In unreported tables, the variable VOICE_ACC_WB is replaced by, in alternative: REG_QUAL_WB, GOV_EFF_WB, FREEDOM. Findings are consistent with 





Panel data regression results: subsample analysis for Holistic and Minimalist companies 
  Dependent variable: HOLISTIC Dependent variable: MINIMALIST 
Variable  
Subsample 1: 
 non-financial firms 
Subsample 2: 
 after 2007 
Subsample 3: 
 after 2013 
Subsample 1: 
 non-financial firms 
Subsample 2: 
 after 2007 
Subsample 3: 
 after 2013 
Coeff.  Marg.eff. Coeff.  Marg.eff. Coeff.  Marg.eff. Coeff.  Marg.eff. Coeff.  Marg.eff. Coeff.  Marg.eff. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  
SIZE  0.675*** 0.077*** 0.822*** 0.073*** 0.967* 0.034 -0.754*** -0.042*** -0.787*** -0.034*** -1.546*** -0.037*** 
  (0.104) (0.011) (0.140) (0.012) (0.560) (0.022) (0.135) (0.008) (0.167) (0.008) (0.587) (0.013) 
ROE  -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.009 -0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.012 0.001 
  (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.018) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.019) (0.001) 
BOARD_SIZE  0.083*** 0.009*** 0.123*** 0.011*** 0.497** 0.017** -0.096** -0.005** -0.083* -0.004* -0.138 -0.003 
  (0.028) (0.003) (0.038) (0.003) (0.201) (0.009) (0.04) (0.002) (0.047) (0.002) (0.127) (0.003) 
BOARD_MEET  0.039* 0.004* 0.055* 0.005* 0.312** 0.011** -0.034 -0.002 -0.012 -0.001 -0.050 -0.001 
  (0.022) (0.002) (0.029) (0.003) (0.133) (0.005) (0.026) (0.001) (0.033) (0.001) (0.093) (0.002) 
BOARD_INDEPEND  0.002 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.057*** 0.002** -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
  (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.022) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.013) (0.001) 
LEVERAGE  0.881 0.100 1.729* 0.154* 4.881 0.171 -2.378*** -0.134*** -2.250** -0.098** -4.202 -0.102 
  (0.701) (0.080) (0.953) (0.086) (3.682) (0.134) (0.836) (0.047) (0.967) (0.043) (2.631) (0.063) 
STRATEGIC_SHARE  -0.006 -0.001 -0.007 -0.001 0.022 0.001 -0.006 -0.001 0.009 0.001 0.023 0.001 
  (0.004) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.029) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.020) (0.001) 
CEO_SHARE  -0.081 -0.009 0.240 0.021 -0.032 -0.001 -0.557** -0.031** -0.696** -0.030** -1.595* -0.039* 
  (0.196) (0.022) (0.284) (0.025) (0.87) (0.031) (0.262) (0.015) (0.329) (0.014) (0.856) (0.021) 
ENV_PERF 0.076*** 0.009*** 0.091*** 0.008*** 0.247*** 0.009*** -0.075*** -0.004*** -0.100*** -0.004*** -0.197*** -0.005*** 
  (0.007) (0.001) (0.011) (0.001) (0.058) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.026) (0.001) 
IND_SENS 0.711** 0.081** 0.758* 0.068* 2.816* 0.099 -1.141*** -0.064*** -1.206** -0.053** -2.330* -0.056* 
  (0.318) (0.035) (0.431) (0.038) (1.485) (0.061) (0.429) (0.024) (0.524) (0.023) (1.267) (0.029) 
GDP  0.001** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002** 0.001** 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
MARKET_INDEX  0.635** 0.072** 0.679** 0.061** -3.541 -0.124 -0.063 -0.004 0.171 0.008 3.331 0.081 
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  (0.272) (0.031) (0.325) (0.029) (5.078) (0.18) (0.35) (0.020) (0.394) (0.017) (4.269) (0.103) 
EPI_INDEX -0.034*** -0.004*** -0.026* -0.002* 0.041 0.001 0.037** 0.002** 0.021 0.001 0.007 0.001 
  (0.012) (0.001) (0.014) (0.001) (0.094) (0.003) (0.017) (0.001) (0.019) (0.001) (0.079) (0.002) 
INV_PROT 0.052 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.404 0.014 -0.210** -0.012** -0.241* -0.011* -0.669** -0.016** 
  (0.091) (0.010) (0.124) (0.011) (0.416) (0.016) (0.103) (0.006) (0.123) (0.005) (0.313) (0.008) 
VOICE_ACC_WB 1.988*** 0.226*** 2.295** 0.205** 11.025** 0.387** -0.282 -0.016 0.275 0.012 -1.765 -0.043 
  (0.751) (0.085) (1.000) (0.090) (4.379) (0.183) (0.998) (0.056) (1.179) (0.052) (2.950) (0.070) 
Intercept  -21.609***  -28.039***  -80.098*** -80.098*** 15.724***  17.941***  43.172***  
  (2.214)  (3.029)  (20.624)  (2.729)  (3.253)  (13.227)  
N  3,637 3,637 3,164 3,164 746 746 3,637 3,637 3,164 3,164 746 746 
Log pseudolikelihood  -1362.693   -1035.938   -309.166   -834.223   -681.733   -175.070  
Notes: This table reports the results from the robustness checks on the Holistic and Minimalist ITR levels. Eq. (2) is estimated for the non-financial firms in the 
Holistic group (Columns 1-2), after 2007 (Columns 3-4) and after 2013 (Columns 5-6). Similarly, Eq. (5) is estimated for the non-financial firms in the Minimalist 
group (Columns 7-8), after 2007 (Columns 9-10) and after 2013 (Columns 11-12). For each regression, it reports coefficients, marginal effects, and standard errors 




ITR switching behaviour among groups 
Notes: This Figure shows the distribution and the average percentage of firms that either maintain the ITR 







Integrated Thinking and Reporting Score (ITR_SCORE) from Thomson Reuters Asset4 
Label Description 
Integration/Vision and Strategy 
(ITR_SCORE) 
The integration/vision and strategy category measures a company's management 
commitment and effectiveness towards the creation of an overarching vision and 
strategy integrating financial and extra-financial aspects. It reflects a company's 
capacity to convincingly show and communicate that it integrates the economic 
(financial), social and environmental dimensions into its day-to-day decision-
making processes. (Asset4 mnemonic CGVS) 
Score - Vision and 
Strategy/Policy 
Does the company have a policy for maintaining an overarching vision and 
strategy that integrates financial and extra-financial aspects of its business? 
(Asset4 mnemonic CGVSD01S) 
Score - Vision and 
Strategy/Implementation 
Does the company describe the implementation of its integrated strategy through 
a public commitment from a senior management or board member? AND Does 
the company describe the implementation of its integrated strategy through the 
establishment of a CSR committee or team? (Asset4 mnemonic CGVSD02S) 
Score - Vision and 
Strategy/Monitoring 
Does the company monitor its integrated strategy through belonging to a specific 
sustainability index? AND Does the company monitor its integrated strategy 
through conducting external audits on its reporting? (Asset4 mnemonic 
CGVSD03S) 
Score - Vision and 
Strategy/Improvements 
Does the company set specific objectives to be achieved on the integrated 
strategy? (Asset4 mnemonic CGVSD04S) 
Score - Vision and 
Strategy/Challenges and 
Opportunities 
Does the company report about the challenges or opportunities linked to the 
integration of financial and extra-financial issues? (Asset4 mnemonic 
CGVSO01S) 
Score - Vision and 
Strategy/Integrated Strategy 
Does the company integrate financial and extra-financial factors in the 
management discussion and analysis section of the annual report? (Asset4 
mnemonic CGVSO02S) 
Score - Vision and 
Strategy/Global Compact 
Signatory 
Is the company a signatory of the Global Compact? (Asset4 mnemonic 
CGVSO03S) 
Score - Vision and 
Strategy/Stakeholder 
Engagement 
Does the company explain how it engages with its stakeholders? (Asset4 
mnemonic CGVSO04S) 
Score - Vision and 
Strategy/Transparency 
Does the company publish a separate CSR/H&S/Sustainability report or publish a 
section in its annual report on CSR/H&S/Sustainability? (Asset4 mnemonic 
CGVSO05S) 
Score - Vision and Strategy/GRI 
Report 
Is the company's CSR report published in accordance with the GRI guidelines? 
(Asset4 mnemonic CGVSO06S) 
Score - Vision and 
Strategy/Global Reporting 
Does the company's extra-financial report take into account of the global 
activities of the company? (Asset4 mnemonic CGVSO07S) 
Score - Vision and 
Strategy/CSR Reporting 
Auditor 
Does the company have an external auditor of its CSR/H&S/Sustainability 
report? (Asset4 mnemonic CGVSO08S) 
Notes: We identify companies’ level of integration based on the variable Asset4 mnemonic CGVS collected 
from Thomson Reuters Asset4. It is obtained from 12 scores which represent various aspects of implementation 
of a firm’s overall integration strategy. This table reports labels and descriptions of the overall score (CGVS) 
used as a measure of integrated thinking and reporting (ITR_SCORE), followed by its components (12 score 
variables). 
